After a long discussion with somebody named Jerry over at Ales Rarus, Jerry has dropped a few comments on my doorstep:
“Purging oneself of philosophies would require a metaphilosophy that dictates that philosophies are bad. . . . Yours may be a spare, minimalistic philosophy, but a denial of philosophy seems bizarre.”
First, bizarre is a matter of context. Maybe a denial of philosophy seems bizarre, but that seeming says nothing about the nature of the denial and everything about the person to whom it seems.
Second, philosophies are unique to humans. This may seem painfully obvious and silly, but for all we can tell the world would exist perfectly well without us (and in fact did so for millions of years). That is, the world operates independently from our thoughts about it. You may object, “Well, perhaps the world does not need a philosophy, but we certainly do! In fact, we cannot function without one!” That may be true, but am I not allowed to doubt everything, including this? And is that doubt itself philosophical doubt, or something else?
Philosophies can certainly be “just a set of heuristics for organizing and explaining the world around you,” but my experience has always been that no philosophy can explain more than just a small portion of the world. That is, no philosophy has ever been successful at its goal, which is to “organize and explain the world.” Otherwise, we should see one or another philosophy taking hold and triumphing over all the others based on its consistent success at doing what it claims. But we have not seen that. Why not? I suspect (though of course I cannot be sure) that it is because the world is fundamentally inexplicable.
We humans are very good at responding to challenges. We can recognize patterns, solve puzzles, and reason both inductively and deductively. But we are only really good at these things in defined situations; widen the parameters of a problem and we are soon bogged down. Sure, most people can understand simple economic rules of thumb like spending more money than they earn will cause problems, but extend your economic sphere to the level of nations and suddenly understanding drops precipitously. We have moved from solving a specific problem (the personal budget) where solutions are easy to working at a systemic problem (the national economy) where “solutions” come mostly from theoretical speculation. Hence economists can be optimistic or pessimistic without losing their jobs. My point is that there is a continuum of problems faced by human beings and some of them require more speculative philosophy than others. Moving from one end (say, keeping the national economy running smoothly) to the other end (say, dodging a rock thrown toward your head) of the range of problems, the difference is clear. The further out you go, the more complicated things get, and the harder it is to explain them. Why?
More importantly, is it even possible to explain the more complicated things? For several days last week people expected hurricane Ivan to plow into New Orleans. Computer models predicted this with varying levels of (un)certainty. Some folks in New Orleans were worried. No one really knew what would happen because hurricanes are complex weather systems whose predictability are still beyond our meteorologists (and are likely to remain that way for a long time, perhaps forever). It turned out that Ivan veered away from New Orleans and went to Alabama. Relief in New Orleans, disaster in Alabama. Sometimes hurricanes even dissipate before they make landfall at all.
Hurricanes are a “natural” problem. There are social and historical problems, too. For instance, why did the United States break in two and fight a war during the 1860s? This is a particularly vexing problem, and one to which historians have returned in every generation since. There has never been a definitive consensus even though there is a wealth of data and many great minds have attacked the problem. Was it a war about culture? Politics? Economics? Was it inevitable? Was it the result of a “blundering generation”? Was it all of these things? We might develop a set of heuristics to organize and explain this problem–and many have tried–but no one has yet succeeded at squeezing all of the available data into a singular philosophical framework, even after 145 years of trying. This leads me to believe that the problem is insoluble if by a “solution” we are looking for a comprehensive narrative that organizes and explains all of the data. In varying degrees, this hurdle lies before every historical problem.
Why did the Reformation occur when, where, and how it did? How did the West come to dominate “the rest”? Why did the Roman Empire fall when and how it did? Why did the Muslim world fall behind the Western world a few centuries ago, where once it was far more advanced? What does it mean to be “advanced” anyway? Why did such a powerful nation as China remain isolated for so many centuries? Or did it? Did the Bantu people of Africa spread their language and culture by conquest or peaceful migration? What happened to the Mayan civilization? Did the birth of Christianity happen as portrayed in the New Testament, or some other way?
Those are all historical questions. There are other questions regarding the nature of human beings, too. What is consciousness? Are we really conscious, or is it an illusion? What is thinking? Are humans fundamentally rational, fundamentally social, fundamentally both, or fundamentally something else? What exactly do our genes do and how to they do it? How did life begin? Why are humans so different from all other forms of life on earth? Why do we have such big brains? Why do we walk upright? Why do we have so little hair? How long has our species existed? Where did it originate? How many other species of hominid were there before Homo sapiens triumphed? How did Homo sapiens triumph?
Then there are the Big questions. Why are we here? Is there a God? What is God anyway? How did the universe come into being? What does it mean to exist? Can there be such a thing as nonexistence? Why do we ask questions? Why are we curious? Why do we want to know? Can we know anything at all?
Most of these questions in all of these categories (natural, historical, species-ontological, existential) are probably fundamentally unanswerable. Even if we could answer them, we would want those answers to fit together. But we have different ways of expecting that, too. Some people feel that should the answer to “Is there a God?” be “Yes,” then the answer to “Did the birth of Christianity happen as portrayed in the New Testament?” would also be “Yes.” Other people disagree. This creates another question: Why do they disagree?
I chose that example for a reason: It actually exists. There are in fact people who think according to both of those possibilities. This is not a generalization or a straw man or anything else, but a simple recognition that there people in the world who disagree on this very specific metaphysical or philosophical difference. It is, if you will, a set of facts that demand a theory. But what if there is no theory? What if there is no singular explanation? Even more dauntingly, what if an explanation is posited that simply leads to more questions?
In my experience, the questions never stop. It is impossible to make a statement that is both a definitive explanation and unquestionable. Even apparently straightforward things are like this: Gravity pulls you toward the ground. Why? Because larger masses attract smaller masses? Why? Because larger masses curve space and create gravity. Why? Keep going. Eventually you get out in that territory where it’s like a huge, open plain and there are physicists wandering around scratching their heads and trying to figure out where they are. Nobody knows.
Because the questions never stop, I am wary of anyone who claims to have a definitive answer. Certainly, some answers are better than others–if someone comes and says that Americans fought their Civil War because Abraham Lincoln was a transvestite, anyone with a slight knowledge of U.S. history will know to discard this answer because it is implausible. But no answers are unquestionable.
Asking questions leads to philosophies. A person may ask why some people are virtuous and others are not. This may lead to a philosophy of virtue. But another person may ask what virtue is, exactly. This may lead to another philosophy. Someone else may ask why these other people are so concerned with virtue. Again, this may lead to another philosophy. Finally, someone may come along and ask why people formulate philosophies. Depending on how you see the problem, this may lead to yet another philosophy or it may lead to the collapse of philosophy. But because questions can always be asked, philosophies can always be broken. That is why I put so little stock in philosophies. They may seem to be explanatory, but because they can only exist as responses to questions they are no more definitive than the questions themselves.
Sets of heuristics for organizing and explaining are limited by space, time, and human subjectivity. The universe allegedly organized and explained by these heuristics is not so limited. But the smaller the problem, the greater the limitation and the more likely that your particular set of heuristics will be useful. Put another way, the more you try to explain, the greater your margin of error. Why did John F. Kennedy die? Because a bullet tore into his head. Simple enough. But try to answer how and why that bullet got there and you’ll have a much tougher time. Why am I alive? Because my mother gave birth to me and my biological needs for survival have been met ever since. Why did she give birth to me? Because one day a sperm got into an egg and started the process that resulted in me. Go back much further than that and you begin to run into problems, controversy, and conflicting ideas. The world beyond our limited range of understanding is unfortunately quite incomprehensible. (A good next question to ask is, “Is the world incomprehensible because we cannot understand it, or can we not understand it because it is incomprehensible?” Unfortunately, it is an unanswerable question, too.)
“If you are just trying to ‘be,’ why are you so passionate about religion (in the negative sense)? Does it help you find food or meet some other bodily necessity that you may ‘be’?”
I don’t know why I am so interested in religion (in the negative sense). But neither do I know why you are interested in religion (in the positive sense). And I suspect that you do not, either. Some people would like to take that question (“Why are we interested in religion?”) and find an intrinsic answer in it (“Because religion is true”), but there is no reason to do that. Usually, when I think about this question, I decide that I am interested in religion for the same reason I am interested in the weather: because it is all around me. Religion has simple effects in my life and more complicated ones, too. An example of a simple effect is that I rather like riding my bike on Sunday mornings because Christians have historically established Sundays as a day of rest, so even people who aren’t in church are not out doing their usual things and there are fewer cars on the road. An example of a complicated effect is that religion affects the way people see their world; I am a part of their world, so religion affects the way other people see me. These are not basic problems like finding food, shelter, water, or oxygen, but they are existential problems and puzzles whose solutions enhance my well-being. (For instance, if I can understand better how religious people see me, I can understand better how to interact with them without too many negative or unwanted effects.)
Finally, I should say that my philosophical (or anti-philosophical, or whatever) views are not chiseled in stone. My views have changed constantly and steadily for at least ten years now and I don’t intend on forcing them to stay put just for the sake of staying put. I like to pursue chains of questions and answers as far as I can. From my perspective, along this intellectual journey that is my life there is a long continuity between my days as a Christian fundamentalist to wherever I am now. Sure, I can tell you the date, the place, and the approximate time of day when I stopped believing in God (September 1, 2000, 9:30 AM), but looking back on the process that sudden shift meant a lot less than it seemed at the time. Perhaps when I am old I shall become some kind of theist again, though I cannot imagine that. However, there are still causes and events and experiences that are yet to shape my life.
Philosophies, in my opinion, are best when temporary and easily tossed aside if the need arises. Some people prefer to build themselves a philosophical house, hunker down, and defend their right to settle until the day they die. Fine. But I don’t think that choice is necessitated by philosophical reflection. And it is that kind of “settled” philosophy to which I object. With every day my knowledge and understanding changes. Sometimes it seems as though I am constantly rebuilding my “set of heuristics.” Sometimes it seems as though I am rebuilding so fast that there is no real structure there at all. It seems silly to me to adhere to a particular philosophy or ideology just because I like it, even though my knowledge is changing. For years I did that within Christianity–adhered to the belief system because I liked it, even though my knowledge was changing. Eventually that method broke down and I had to unhitch myself. Now I would rather follow the chaotic, if incomprehensible, flow of the universe than try to impose some narrative upon it. That is why you might say I am “anti-philosophy.” Split your hairs and terminology however you like, but that is where I am and attempts to tether me or fence me in do not usually go well.